2020 or 1984? Mass Surveillance and Suzhi in the Chinese Social Credit System

By *Vincent Brussee*[1]

Abstract

This paper critically assesses the development of the Chinese Social Credit System (SCS) and its representations in popular media. Using Chinese language state documents, media reports, and English-language newspaper articles, this paper first provides an outline of the current state of the system. This article finds that rather than only focusing on individuals, the system encompasses the entire society. Evidence presented in this paper demonstrates that the system's scope, conceptualisation and operationalisation of 'trustworthiness', and incentive structures are not designed to facilitate mass surveillance. In particular, there is no evidence that no political data will be processed in the system. To better understand the development of the system, this paper employs the notion of suzhi *(素质 'human quality') to highlight how the system is supposed to function as a tool to improve trustworthiness, thereby aiming to improve economic management and urban quality of life.*

Keywords: Cyber-governance, Social Credit System, suzhi, mass surveillance, China.

---

1   Vincent Brussee is an honours student at the Research MA Asian Studies at Leiden University. His research focuses on (cyber) politics and digital society in China, with particular interest for issues of information management and censorship worldwide. Email: vbrussee@gmail.com.

INTRODUCTION

If we are to believe 'Western'[2] media, the Orwellian dystopia of 1984 has finally come true in China. In the eyes of many journalists, the Chinese Social Credit System (*shehui xinyong tixi* 社会信用体系 – hereafter SCS) appears to be everything democratic societies are afraid of: a totalitarian government that rates citizens based on their obedience to the state, a single score that determines one's place in society, and a society without any privacy (see e.g. Hvistendahl 2017; Dockrill 2018). However, is the SCS really this Orwellian dystopia it is claimed to be?

There are two key reasons for scholars to study the SCS. First of all, the Western discourse surrounding the SCS might be considered Orientalist. It creates a narrative that poses China as the 'totalitarian, dystopian other' against the 'democratic, free us'. Secondly, while credit systems themselves are nothing new to developed economies, the all-encompassing scope of China's SCS makes it a highly unique development. All the while, as the system is still being developed, very little academic literature is available on the subject and it is still unclear what it will look like.

There is a number of misunderstandings concerning the current state of the system, which is the consequence of problematic media coverage in 'The West'. First, the government-mandated system is frequently confused with private-sector initiatives such as Sesame Credit (*Zhima Xinyong* 芝麻信用), created by the Chinese e-commerce giant Alibaba. However, Sesame Credit is completely distinct from the state: it does not share any data with the state and the People's Bank of China (PBC) recently shut down the Sesame Credit pilot (Creemers 2018, 24). Second, the confusion between the two systems has let a number of media outlets to believe that the SCS is a gamified system (Mondato 2018; Botsman 2017). However, these analyses are based on Sesame Credit, which features an easily accessible scoring overview and the ability to compare these scores with others. Therefore, these assessments do not accurately represent the SCS. Third, nearly all of the Western coverage of the SCS only narrowly focuses on the 'personal' (*geren* 个人) rating element of the SCS, whereas Chinese official state documents suggest a much broader scope (State Council 2014). Section two will explore this in more detail.

In order to contribute to a more accurate understanding of the

---

2   The dichotomy between the "West" and "China" is a potentially problematic one, but it is beyond the point of this paper to deconstruct this. In the remainder of this paper, I will use the "West" as a shorthand to discuss English-language media based in the geographic regions of the United States, Canada, Europe, and Oceania.

SCS, this paper will answer the following questions: to what extent can the SCS be considered a mass surveillance system, and how can we accurately contextualise the system to understand its purpose and goals? To answer this question, the remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section two presents an overview of the current state of the SCS based on Chinese-language primary sources – primarily official documents – followed by a brief analysis of how the SCS has been implemented in recent pilots. This background is necessary for the third section, which will then turn to answer the first part of the research question by analysing the surveillance elements of the SCS. I will argue that, although there are certain arguments to consider the SCS a form of mass surveillance, this is not the system's intended goal. Instead, I argue in the fourth section that the SCS should be contextualised as a system that attempts to raise the *suzhi* ('quality') of Chinese citizens. This context enhances our understanding of the motivations behind the system and the public response to it. The main conclusion is that the SCS is not a copy of George Orwell's novel *1984*, but a 2020 implementation of what the Chinese state has been doing for at least a hundred years.

The All-Encompassing Nature of the Social Credit System

The SCS virtually encompasses the entire Chinese society, with the key focus being the economy: the director of the Ministry of Commerce's Centre on Credit and Electronic Commerce Han Jiaping describes the SCS as a 'social and economic management mechanism' (2014). Similarly, scholar Rogier Creemers states that 'developing the financial services industry' is a key priority for the SCS (2018, 25). Other than the economy, governmental and judicial affairs are also included in the scope of the SCS, but very little information is known about these. When it comes to the commercial elements, the overarching idea is that any entity in any commercial sector is assigned a publicly available business social credit code (*qiye shehui xinyong daima* 企业社会信用代码). This code informs anyone about the 'credit status' of the company, including a wide range of factors, from legal violations to product quality complaint inquiries. The database is publicly accessible at https://www.creditchina.gov.cn/. On the basis of these factors, a court can put a company on a redlist or blacklist, the former meant for outstanding records, the latter for severe violations (State Council 2014).

    The final element of the SCS consists of individual creditworthiness,

which is the item most discussed by Western media. Its purpose is to promote individual creditworthiness by rewarding trustworthiness and punishing untrustworthiness, and to raise the trust level of the entire society (State Council 2016a). As the focus of such frequent discussion, the remainder of this paper will also focus on this aspect. Four questions here are essential: How is the classification (or score) constructed? What is considered 'untrustworthy' behaviour that can result in one being blacklisted? What are the actual consequences of being redlisted or blacklisted? How are these put into practice in local pilots? I will discuss these below.

First, the construction. As trustworthiness is nigh impossible to measure, the system has to use proxy data. An example of such a proxy in the SCS is jaywalking: excessive jaywalking might suggest that the person in question does not care about others' safety, thus they will be rated less 'trustworthy'. Inversely, citizens that do volunteer work may be considered more trustworthy. This is recorded through a variety of means. Some illegal action can be caught on security camera feed through facial recognition and linked to one's personal details. However, as Rogier Creemer highlights, 'there seems to be little algorithmic processing of data' (2018, 22) and the SCS is a 'rather crude tool' (2018, 26). Indeed, none of the official documents refer to any use of big data (*da shuju* 大数据). Moreover, considering Sesame Credit has been reviewed negatively and shut down by the PBC, it appears unlikely that the SCS will use big data in a similar way. Instead, official documents are the primary material used in the calculation of one's classification.

Second, there is the question of 'trustworthiness'. How exactly is this rather broad term applied in the SCS? While it is impossible to outline the entire range of 'untrustworthy' behaviour, a number of Memorandums of Understanding have been released for each subfield of the SCS that allow one to construct a more general notion. For instance, in the field of charitable donations, untrustworthy people are those who pose as a charitable organisation to obtain property by fraud (National Development and Reform Commission 2018). People who misbehave on flights – for instance, smoking or using fake identities – are banned from flying (National Development and Reform Commission 2018). The examples highlighted here are mainly forms of serious misconduct and do not necessarily relate to any measures against opposition leaders or critics. Broadly speaking, the system appears to be targeting two general types of 'untrustworthy' people: people who are involved in criminal activities, in particular white-collar crime, and people who misbehave in public.

Third, rewards and punishments are mostly in the form of preferential access to services or service denial, respectively. For citizens with good credit, 'all levels of people's government should innovate incentivisation measures for trustworthiness' (State Council 2016a). In general, citizens or entities with a good score will have better access to 'services and conveniences'. For instance, extra support can be given to entrepreneurs in administrative processes, and they will be facilitated more effectively by the state. Administrative permits can be processed more quickly and 'green channels' can be set up to further incentivise trustworthiness (State Council 2016a). Citizens with poor credit, on the other hand, will be provided with 'differentiated services' (ibid.) and restricted or even banned from exiting the country, buying real estate, travelling by plane or high-speed rail, staying in star-rated hotels, and other types of 'high spending conduct' (State Council 2016b).

Fourth and finally, many of the observations made above are also reflected in the local pilots where the SCS has been trialled. In the appendix, I have made an overview of publicly available information on local pilots, compiled on the basis of primary sources in both Chinese and Western media. This list is not necessarily comprehensive but nevertheless highlights a couple of key findings. The cities of Rongcheng 荣成 and Hangzhou 杭州 are considered successful pilots as they have received widespread acceptance and national awards, respectively (Minstreanu 2018; Zhuang 2018; *Zhongguo Qingnian Wang* 2017). In both pilots, the information used is indeed largely based on official documents: crimes or petty offenses can decrease one's score, whereas volunteer work or blood donations can increase one's score. Just like the official documents stipulate, rewards and punishments largely consist of green channels or blacklists for public services, respectively. Both pilots have created distinct scoring systems to rank their citizens, but these scores mostly resemble traditional credit scores in the sense that they are not easily accessible and comparable to others.

Only one pilot has attempted to also use data in the SCS with a more 'political' or 'social' nature: the county of Suining 睢宁. The SCS here included data on one's education level, online behaviour, and political activism in its scoring mechanisms. However, the pilot was slammed by both online commenters and national media; the People's Daily – the mouthpiece newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party – even criticised it for its arbitrary criteria (The Economist 2016; Shi and Zhang 2018). Due to this heavy criticism it appears unlikely that the nation-wide SCS will include such factors.

The final pilot that deserves a mention is the pilot in Guizhou 贵州, which is the first pilot where big data is claimed to be used in the SCS. However, this so far appears to be rather limited in its implementation: the data is managed in the 'Guizhou Credit Cloud' (*Guizhou xinyongyun* 贵州信用云) platform, where the local government manages 3.7 million pieces of data on individuals and 25.08 million on businesses (Guan 2017). It is remarkable that there is relatively little emphasis on individual data here: this would mean only one piece of information per nine citizens is stored, much less than on businesses. Thus, it would be difficult to consider this a true case of big data.

Mass Surveillance and the Social Credit System?

With this background in mind, how can we understand the SCS? Is it really the dystopian mass surveillance system it is claimed to be? In this section, I will argue that the SCS is not primarily a mass surveillance system, although some elements could be used for mass surveillance and state control. The Real-Name Registration System (RNRS) is regarded as one of the primary reasons why the SCS is often considered as a mass surveillance system. Indeed, the State Council itself also posits the RNRS as the foundation for the SCS (State Council 2016a). The idea of the RNRS is that in order to access an online service, a user will have to sign up with their real name, which subsequently has to be verified. Theoretically, this means any online move can be traced, but in practice it is much less far-reaching. The RNRS does not require users to sign in to *browse* websites, meaning one's browsing behaviour cannot be traced. In essence, it is even less far-reaching than Facebook's regulations, which require users to be signed on with their real name at all times, even when browsing its content ('Facebook Community Standards' 2019). Furthermore, the data on the actual pilots has already revealed that no political dimension is given to the SCS: the only pilot including political data has been criticised and shut down.

Nevertheless, some minor reasons remain to believe the SCS can be used by the Chinese state as a mass surveillance system to spy on and control its citizens. The language used by Chinese authorities to describe internet laws is – purposefully – very vague (see e.g. *Zhongguo Jingji Wang* 2017). Take 'rumours' (*chuanyao* 传谣) as an example. The interpretation of this term can range from – purely factually speaking – 'fake news' to anything that

endangers the political status quo.

In addition, the current situation in Xinjiang highlights some of the origins of the mass surveillance discourse. In the name of maintaining stability and harmony, the Chinese surveillance system 'overwhelms daily life' (Chin and Bürge 2017). Citizens' moves are tracked wherever they go using facial recognition, mobile phone scanners, and blacklists. This use of facial recognition and blacklists is frequently associated with the SCS, but there is no evidence that such forms of mass surveillance will also make it to the nation-wide system.

This is exactly the issue with much of the coverage on the SCS in Western media. Indeed, there are many elements in China's regulatory system that limit freedom of speech and political freedom, but the SCS is not designed to expand those into a new dimension of mass surveillance: those systems are already in place. This becomes even more clear when looking at the punishments used for 'untrustworthy behaviour'. As previously discussed, these consist mostly of limits on high-class spending, luxury travel, and the imposing of bureaucratic constraints. However, the system does not include any provisions that would – for instance – prevent an activist from speaking up against the regime beyond what the current law already provisions for. Similarly, a Xinjiang separatist would not be stopped if they could only use conventional rail rather than high-speed rail.

Contextualising the Social Credit System: Raising People's *Suzhi*

If the system is not a mass surveillance system, then what does the SCS intend to achieve? In this last section, I will argue that the SCS can be best understood as a tool to raise the population's *suzhi* 素质. *Suzhi* here can be translated as 'quality' (Tomba 2009, 592; Sigley 2009, 537; Alpermann 2013, 9), 'human quality' (Huang 2016, 908) or 'Quality' with a capital Q (Kipnis 2006, 303–4). Regardless, *suzhi* should be considered a term that encompasses a whole range of meanings and is very flexible in its usage; it concerns cultural knowledge, ideology, politics, morality, and behaviour (Bakken 1994, 37). For instance, countless issues are related to people's lack of *suzhi*, from the poor behaviour of Chinese citizens to political problems such as the lack of democracy (Huang 2016, 908). The improvement of *suzhi* is therefore considered 'a mission of national importance' (Kipnis 2006, 297).

In this context, it is closely related to Foucault's notion of biopower.

Foucault defines biopower as the transformation of political power away from the right to decide over life and death, towards the 'management' of life (Genel 2006, 46). For China, the power of the state is the power to form and improve life (Bakken 1994, 45) and *suzhi* discourse is a significant aspect of this power. For instance, Luigi Tomba argues that suzhi is the cornerstone of three major governmental objectives concerning economy, social order, and self-governance and self-improvement (Tomba 2009, 592–93). Other scholars add to this by arguing that *suzhi* is essential in the legitimising of party-state policies (Murphy 2004, 5).

Suzhi discourse is not just a recent trend: multiple scholars highlight that scholars and statesmen in early-modern and Republican China were already very familiar with the idea of 'population quality' (Kipnis 2006, 305; Sigley 2009, 540). For instance, the famous Chinese scholar Liang Qichao (1873–1929) argued that the power of a nation was not determined by quantity, but by 'the value placed on individual members' (Cited in: Sigley 2009, 540). Furthermore, the discourse is not only top-down, but *suzhi* is also appropriated by Chinese citizens themselves. Both high-*suzhi* and low-*suzhi* citizens have taken recourse to this discourse, either to normalise and justify certain distinctions (Tomba 2009, 604) or to recast and improve oneself (Alpermann 2013, 10–11).

Key elements of this *suzhi* discourse also return in the discussion of the SCS. I previously highlighted that the SCS is supposed to purify the social environment and mark the transition to the socialist market economy (Baidu Baike 2018). The SCS strives to enable and accelerate this transition by assigning points based on citizens' behaviour. As my analysis in chapters three and four has highlighted, the main factors that can improve one's score are charitable deeds – behaviour that is associated with high-*suzhi* citizens. Inversely, points are deducted for breaking the law and for other behaviour that is not illegal but considered immoral regardless. Examples of the latter are restaurant no-shows (Xu and Xiao 2018) and jaywalking (Li 2018; Lim 2018): these are not necessarily illegal or punishable, but can be considered harmful to the market economy. For instance, if low-*suzhi* citizens repeatedly make reservations for restaurants but never show up, this will directly hurt the restaurant. Thus, low-*suzhi* directly harms the economy. On the contrary, charitable deeds benefit the modernisation process. Blood donations will help in the treatment of patients, while waste recycling will improve the environment.

This context is essential to understand the SCS for two reasons. First

of all, *suzhi* discourse allows one to understand why the population may support the SCS. By improving the people's *suzhi*, the life in China's large cities is supposed to become more pleasant: cars would stop for pedestrians at a crosswalk, and cars will no longer be held up by jaywalkers (as appears to be the case in Rongcheng); one would no longer have to pay deposit for a hotel or car on the basis of a good credit score; and cities will become cleaner as trash is always thrown into the trash bins. Preliminary research suggests that Chinese people indeed focus primarily on this positive aspect and also support it for that reason (Koetse 2018). More interestingly, the support for the SCS significantly increases with income level, suggesting that more well-educated citizens support the system (Kostka 2018, 14). This is also explained through *suzhi*, as the model citizen that the *suzhi* system presents is the civilised, middle-class educated professional or intellectual (Tomba 2009, 593). Second, by contextualising the SCS in this way, it becomes clear that the SCS is – in essence – nothing new. Instead, it is a twenty-first century implementation of policies and discourses that have existed in Chinese society for a long time, as the *suzhi*-related discourse has persisted for at least a hundred years now.

CONCLUSION

The Social Credit System encompasses many things, but proper understanding has been lacking in popular media. I started this paper by highlighting three problematic misunderstandings in popular Western media: the confusion between the SCS and Sesame Credit, the role of gamification, and the overly narrow focus on individual ratings. To create a more accurate understanding, the central objective of this paper was to create a preliminary yet comprehensive overview of the system and to combine this with an accurate context against which to understand its developments. In section two, I provided such an overview by highlighting the many different aspects of society covered by the SCS, how the main targets of the system are not anti-government activists but rather different forms of (petty or serious) crime. This stems not just from the scope of the system itself, but also from the rewards and punishments, which are set up in a way that signals their focus on the more affluent parts of society.

So, what does this tell us about the interpretation of the SCS as a mass surveillance system? Theoretically speaking, the RNRS and facial recognition

cameras allow the government to track offline and online moves. Nevertheless, there are serious reasons to question such an interpretation. This would go against every successful pilot so far and those that have worked with political data have been considered unsuccessful. Furthermore, the intended rewards and punishments are simply not set up as a mass surveillance tool.

Instead of thinking of the SCS as a form of mass surveillance, I have proposed to assess the system as a suzhi-raising tool. This context allows observers to understand why the Chinese government initiated the system and why Chinese citizens appear to support it. Moreover, it allows us to understand the SCS not as something wholly new, but as a twenty-first century version of what the Chinese government has sought to do for over a hundred years already. Using this context, further research should be conducted to survey the different dimensions of the SCS in further depth and to assess the actual implementation once the system becomes more commonplace nation-wide around 2020.

REFERENCES

ALPERMANN, Björn. 2013. "Class, Citizenship, Ethnicity: Categories of Social Distinction and Identification in Contemporary China". In *Interdependencies of Social Categorisations*, edited by Caniela CÉLLERI, Tobias SCHWARZ, and Bea WITTGER, 237–61. Madrid: Iberoamericana.

BAIDU BAIKE 百度百科. 2018. "Shehui Xinyong Tixi 社会信用体系 [Social Credit System]". https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E7%A4%BE%E4%BC%9A%E4%BF%A1%E7%94%A8%E4%BD%93%E7%B3%BB/1057379?fr=aladdin.

BAKKEN, Børge. 1994. *The Exemplary Society*. ISO-Rapport 9. Oslo: Department of Sociology, University of Oslo.

BOTSMAN, Rachel. 2017. "Big Data Meets Big Brother as China Moves to Rate Its Citizens". *Wired*, 2017. http://www.wired.co.uk/article/chinese-government-social-credit-score-privacy-invasion.

CREEMERS, Rogier. 2018. "China's Social Credit System: An Evolving Practice of Control". https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3175792.

DOCKRILL, Peter. 2018. "China's Chilling "Social Credit System" Is Straight Out of Dystopian Sci-Fi, And It's Already Switched On". *ScienceAlert*, 20 September 2018. https://www.sciencealert.com/china-s-dystopian-social-credit-system-science-fiction-black-mirror-mass-surveillance-digital-dictatorship.

"Facebook Community Standards". 2019. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/integrity_authenticity.

GENEL, Katia. 2006. "The Question of Biopower: Foucault and Agamben". *Rethinking Marxism* 18 (1): 43–62.

GUAN, Ranmin 关燃敏. 2017. "Guizhou Huo Pi Jianshe Shehui Xinyong Tixi Yu Dashuju Ronghe Fazhan Shidian Sheng 贵州获批建设社会信用体系与大数据融合发展试点省发布会 [Guizhou Approved the Construction of the Social Credit System and the Development of the Pilot Province for the Fusion with Big Data Conference]". Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guowuyuan Xinwen Bangongshi 中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室. http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/gssxwfbh/xwfbh/guizhou/document/1613544/1613544.htm.

HAN, Jiaping. 2014. "Shehui Xinyong Tixi de Neihuan Yu Waiyan 社会信用体系的内涵与外延 [The Meaning and Extension of "Social Credit System]". State Council, 2014. https://china-social-credit.com/2017/07/meaning-extension-social-credit-system/.

HUANG, Haifeng. 2016. "Personal Character or Social Expectation: A Formal Analysis of "suzhi" in China". *Journal of Contemporary China* 25 (102): 908–22.

HVISTENDAHL, Mara. 2017. "Inside China's Vast New Experiment in Social Ranking". *Wired*, 2017. https://www.wired.com/story/age-of-social-credit/.

KIPNIS, Andrew. 2006. "Suzhi: A Keyword Approach". *The China Quarterly*, no. 186: 295–313.

KOETSE, Manya. 2018. "Open Sesame: Social Credit in China as Gate to Punititve Measures and Personal Perks". *Whats on Weibo*, 2018. https://www.whatsonweibo.com/open-sesame-social-credit-in-china-as-gate-to-punitive-measures-and-personal-perks/.

KOSTKA, Genia. 2018. "China's Social Credit Systems and Public Opinion: Explaining High Levels of Approval". *SSRN*. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3215138.

LI, Tao. 2018. "Jaywalkers Under Surveillance in Shenzhen Soon To Be Punished Via Text Messages". *South China Morning Post*, 2018. http://www.scmp.com/tech/china-tech/article/2138960/jaywalkers-under-surveillance-shenzhen-soon-be-punished-text.

LIM, Nicole. 2018. "Jaywalkers Punished With Social Media Shame". *Sixth Tone*, 2018. http://www.sixthtone.com/news/1002025/jaywalkers-punished-with-social-media-shame.

LIU, Yang. 2017. "Guizhou Huo Pi Jianshe Shehui Xinyong Tixi Yu Dashuju Ronghe Fazhan Shidian

Sheng 贵州获批建设社会信用体系与大数据融合发展试点省 [Guizhou Approved the Construction of the Social Credit System and the Development of the Pilot Province for the Fusion with Big Data]", 2017. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-12/15/content_5247212.htm.

Minstreanu, Simina. 2018. "Life Inside China"s Social Credit Laboratory". *Foreign Policy*, 2018. http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/03/life-inside-chinas-social-credit-laboratory/.

Mondato. 2018. "Sesame Credit: Back Door to a Dystopian Future?" *Mondato Insight* (blog). 2018. http://blog.mondato.com/sesame-credit-dystopian-future/.

Murphy, Rachel. 2004. "Turning Peasants into Modern Chinese Citizens: "Population Quality" Discourse, Demographic Transition and Primary Education". *The China Quarterly*, no. 177: 1–12.

National Development and Reform Commission. 2018. "Yinfa 'Guanyu Dui Cishan Juanzeng Lingyu Xiangguan Zhuti Shishi Shouxin Lianhe Jili he Shixin Lianhe Chengjie de Hezuo Beiwanglu' de Tongzhi 印发《关于对慈善捐赠领域相关主体实施守信联合激励和失信联合惩戒的合作备忘录》的通知 [Memorandum of Understanding on the Implementation of Joint Rewards for the Trustworthy and Joint Discipline Action Against the Untrustworthy in the Field of Charitable Donations]". Translated by China Law Translate. https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/%E5%85%B3%E4%BA%8E%E5%AF%B9%E6%85%88%E5%96%84%E6%8D%90%E8%B5%A0%E9%A2%86%E5%9F%9F%E7%9B%B8%E5%85%B3%E4%B8%BB%E4%BD%93%E5%AE%9E%E6%96%BD%E5%AE%88%E4%BF%A1%E8%81%94%E5%90%88%E6%BF%80%E5%8A%B1%E5%92%8C/?lang=en.

———. 2018. "Guanyu Zai Yiding Qixian Nei Shidang Xianzhi Teding Yanzhong Shixin Ren Shengzuo Minyong Hangkongqi Tuidong Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe de Yijian 关于在一定期限内适当限制特定严重失信人乘坐民用航空器 推动社会信用体系建设的意见 [Opinions on Appropriately Limiting Specified Seriously Untrustworthy Persons from Taking Civil Aircraft, and Promoting the Establishment of the Social Credit System]". Translated by China Law Translate. https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/%E5%85%B3%E4%BA%8E%E5%9C%A8%E4%B8%80%E5%AE%9A%E6%9C%9F%E9%99%90%E5%86%85%E9%80%82%E5%BD%93%E9%99%90%E5%88%B6%E7%89%B9%E5%AE%9A%E4%B8%A5%E9%87%8D%E5%A4%B1%E4%BF%A1%E4%BA%BA%E4%B9%98%E5%9D%90%E6%B0%91/?lang=en.

Pak, Jennifer. 2018. "How Does China"s Social Credit System Work?" *Marketplace*, 2018. https://www.marketplace.org/2018/02/13/world/qa-china-s-social-credit-system.

Shi, Yi 施忆, and Zhang Xin 张鑫. 2018. "Jiangsu Suining Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe Fen San Liu Jiu Deng Re Zhengyi 江苏睢宁社会信用体系建设 分三六九等惹争议 [Jiangsu and Suining Social Credit System Construction Parts Three Six Nine Provoke Controversy]". *People"s Daily*, 2018. http://js.people.com.cn/n/2014/0620/c360300-21473226.html.

Sigley, Gary. 2009. "Suzhi, the Body, and the Fortunes of Technoscientific Reasoning in Contemporary China". *Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique* 17 (3): 537–66.

State Council. 2014. "Guowuyuan Guanyu Yinfa Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe Guihua Gangyao (2014—2020 Nian) de Tongzhi 国务院关于印发社会信用体系建设规划纲要（2014—2020年）的通知 [State Council Notice Concerning Issuance of the Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014-2020)]". Translated by China Law Translate. *State Council Release* 21. http://www.chinalawtranslate.com/socialcreditsystem/?lang=en.

———. 2016a. "Guowuyuan Bangong Ting Guanyu Jiaqiang Geren Chengxin Tixi Jianshe de Zhidao Yijian 国务院办公厅关于加强个人诚信体系建设的指导意见 [Guiding Opinion by the General Office of the State Council on Strengthening the Establishment of the Personal Creditworthiness System]". Translated by China Law Translate. *SGO Release* 98. http://www.chinalawtranslate.com/7079-2/?lang=en.

———. 2016b. "Guowuyuan Guangyu Jianli Wanshan Shouxin Lianhe Jili He Shixin Lianhe Chengjie Zhidu Jiakuai Tuijin Shehui Chengxin Jianshe de Zhidao Yijian 国务院关于建立完善守信联合激励和失信联合惩戒制度加快推进社会诚信建设的指导意见 [The State Council Guiding Opinions on Establishing and Improving Systems of Joint Incentives for Trustworthiness and Joint Disciplinary Action for Untrustworthiness and Accelerating the Establishment of the Social Credit System]". Translated by CHINA LAW TRANSLATE. *Legal Release* 33. http://www.chinalawtranslate.com/publicopinionresponse/?lang=en.

THE ECONOMIST. 2016. "China Invents the Digital Totalitarian State". *The Economist*, 2016. https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21711902-worrying-implications-its-social-credit-project-china-invents-digital-totalitarian.

TOMBA, Luigi. 2009. "Of Quality, Harmony, and Community: Civilisation and the Middle Class in Urban China". *Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique* 17 (3): 592–616.

ZHUANG, Zhengyue 庄郑悦. 2018. "Hangzhou Shi Ronghuo Quanguo Shou Pi Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe Shifan Chengshi 杭州市荣获全国首批社会信用体系建设示范城市 [Hangzhou Receives First National Demonstration City Award for the Construction of the Social Credit System]". *Zhejiang Chengzhen Wang* 浙江城镇网. http://town.zjol.com.cn/cstts/201801/t20180110_6292357.shtml.

XU, Vicky Xiuzhong, and BANG Xiao. 2018. "China"s Social Credit System Seeks to Assign Citizens Scores, Engineer Social Behaviour". *ABC News*, 2018. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-31/chinas-social-credit-system-punishes-untrustworthy-citizens/9596204.

ZENG, Meg Jing. 2018. "China"s Social Credit System Puts Its People under Pressure to Be Model Citizens". *The Conversation*, 2018. https://theconversation.com/chinas-social-credit-system-puts-its-people-under-pressure-to-be-model-citizens-89963.

Zhongguo Jingji Wang 中国经济网. 2017. "Gongan Tixing: Duoming Qunzhu Yi Bei Juliu Chu Fen 9 Zhong Xiaoxi Qianwan Bie Fa 公安提醒：多名群主已被拘留处分 9种消息千万别发 [Public Safety Reminder: Multiple Group Owners Have Already Been Detained for Punishment, 9 Kinds of Information That Should Absolutely Not Be Sent]", 2017. http://m.ce.cn/sh/sgg/201709/11/t20170911_25887610.shtml.

Zhongguo Qingnian Wang 中国青年网. 2017. "Mingque Geren Xinyong Guanli Renren Dou You Xinyongfen 明确个人信用管理 人人都有信用分 [Clearly Defined Personal Credit Management - Every Person Has a Credit Score]", 2017. http://news.china.com/news100/11038989/20170815/31097499.html.